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Dumping and the United States Steel Industry
by Robert B. Peabody*
N HIS PAPER, Mr. Steele has spoken about the propensity of advanced
free world economies to import steel and has suggested that, all things
considered, such propensity is not too bad.1
The very name of the topic assigned to me-"Dumping and the United
States Steel Industry"-suggests that in fact there is no such propensity in-
sofar as the importing of steel into the United States is concerned. My dic-
tionary defines propensity as "an intense and often urgent natural
inclination." The dumping of steel into the United States has been far from a
"natural" inclination. In fact, it has been precisely the opposite-a most un-
natural and intensively cultivated policy-a policy deliberately employed
which has materially injured the United States steel industry.
Having said this by way of apprising you of my premise, let me quickly
outline my salient points. First, I will describe briefly the domestic United
States steel industry and introduce a few statistics designed to characterize
what has been happening to the domestic industry. Second, I want to make
clear what dumping is under our statute and why it is a problem. Third, I
will try to review briefly the nature of that dumping, what generates it and
what its effects have been. Finally, I will attempt to divine the future.
As a preliminary matter, let me describe the American Iron and Steel
Institute (AISI).
The American Iron and Steel Institute is a trade association of iron and
steel producers (and their employees) in the Western hemisphere. There are
about 2,100 individual members. As one would expect, most of our company
members are based in the United States. United States member companies
account for about ninety-two percent of the total United States production
capability. The principal Canadian steel producers also are members. In fact,
the chief executive officers of Stelco, Algoma and Dofasco are directors of
AISI. There are member companies from Mexico and South America as well.
As a trade association, AISI does not itself produce or sell a pound of
steel, nor does AISI have any commercial, production, financial or manage-
ment role with respect to the iron and steel industry in the United States, in
Canada or elsewhere. In brief, AISI is not a cartel, it is not a Eurofer, and it
is not a "club." Those familiar with United States antitrust laws will ap-
preciate how sincerely I make this point.
Consequently, my remarks are made only from an industry-wide or over-
view perspective, and not with respect to the views of specific companies, nor
* General Counsel, Executive Vice President and Treasurer, American Iron & Steel
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with regard to the harm suffered by individual company employees or
shareholders or those who supply goods and services to the domestic steel
companies. Finally, my remarks are personal and do not represent the views
of industry in general or AISI in particular.
Steel is by far the most versatile and inexpensive of all structural
materials known to modem industrial civilization. Our world of today and
tomorrow could not exist without it. Moreover, given the same physical,
chemical and metallurgical specifications, steel is capable of being a fungible
commodity; that is, the product produced to a specification by one company
should be the same as the product produced by another company in another
country.
There are about 200 companies which produce steel in the United States.
They range in size from the largest, which ship many millions of tons of steel
mill products each year, to so-called "mini-mills," with productive capabilities
of about 100,000 tons per year.
Each company is privately owned and privately financed. There is no
state steel company or industry. The companies obtain their funds in the
public marketplace, and not from the national treasury, directly or indirectly.
The companies are individual competitors; there is no "public utility" statute
which guarantees any return on investment or assures a market.
The companies in the domestic steel industry are, however, severely
regulated; the United States antitrust and securities laws are of particular
significance. The basic aim of those statutes is to enhance and maintain com-
petition-not competitors as such, but the philosophic or economic goal of
competition. Because of those statutes, business and economic practices which
prevail in Europe and Japan are not practiced in the United States steel in-
dustry. The EEC basing-point price system mentioned by Mr. Steele, 2 for ex-
ample, could not apply in the United States. Price discriminations in
domestic commerce are prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act.3 Restrictive
output, price restraint and other business practices which affect supply or
price competition, as such, are forbidden by United States laws-laws which
not only permit public enforcement against violators, but also create incen-
tives for private, self-help enforcement through class actions and treble
damage recovery. These legal rules which apply to each of the United States
steel companies, and which are strictly enforced against them, have a
material effect on how the industry views that form of international price
discrimination which is dumping, and more particularly, how the industry
views the enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of the United States anti-
dumping laws.
The industry currently employs in its iron and steel operations about
452,000 persons. Of this total, 337,000 are wage employees and 115,000 are
salaried employees. Total assets in 1977 were about $35.4 billion and total
revenues were about $39.7 billion. It takes about one dollar of capital invest-
2 Id. at 31.
3 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 et seq. (1976)).
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ment to produce one dollar of sales revenues. The industry in 1977 had ap-
proximately 816,000 shareholders and paid dividends totalling about $578
million.
The individual companies can be categorized by referring to integrated
or non-integrated companies, carbon or specialty companies, hot metal or
cold charge facilities, flat rolled or full range. There are many different ways
to look at the makeup of the 200 or so companies.
The industry is highly unionized. Substantially all steel plant production
and maintenance wage employees are represented by the United Steelworkers
of America. The United Mineworkers union represents almost all production
and maintenance wage employees in coal operations. At least ten or twelve
other unions represent wage employees in specific operations. The salaried
workforce is basically non-unionized.
I would like to draw your attention to a few comparative and crucial
statistics. In 1965, the industry shipped 92.66 million tons of steel. Of that
amount, 2.49 million tons were exported. Imports were 10.38 million tons.
The domestic apparent supply, therefore, was 100.55 million tons, of which
imported steel comprised 10.52%. In 1977, a year which was the third largest
on record for the consumption of steel in the United States (exceeded only by
1973 and 1974), the domestic industry shipped 91.14 million tons of steel, or
about 1.5 million tons less than it shipped in 1965. Two million tons were ex-
ported. Imports were 19.3 million tons. The domestic apparent supply,
therefore, was 108.44 million tons, of which imported steel comprised
17.79%.
A few other similar comparisons:
(1) Employees in steel operations: In 1965, 624,764; in 1977, 452,588,
or a reduction of 172,375 persons.
(2), Long-term debt: In 1965, $3.2 billion; in 1977, $7.93 billion.
(3) Capital expenditures: In the period 1965 through 1977, a total
of $28.4 billion.
(4) Return on revenue and shareholders' equity: In 1965, 5.9%
and 9.4%, respectively; in 1977, 0.96% and 0.1%.
What do all these statistics mean? What is the significance of a ninety
percent increase in foreign steel in the United States since 1965? Isn't that
good for the domestic consumer? Isn't that only what we expect from free
trade?
These questions lead quickly to dumping and what it is in the United
States.
The relevant statute is the Antidumping Act of 1921. 4 The concept of
the Act is quite simple. It is designed to prevent unfair competition of foreign
goods with those produced domestically. Specifically, it is intended by the Act
that a foreign exporter should not be permitted to practice price discrimina-
tion between his home market and the United States market; that is, he can't
sell steel in his home country markets at higher prices than he charges for the
4 Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1976)).
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same steel when it is ready for export to the United States, if doing so would
cause injury to the United States industry.5
Another aspect of fair competition under the Act is that a producer
ought not to be able to sell into the United States at prices below his cost of
production. Specifically, where the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
home market sales have been made at less than the cost of production over
an extended period of time, in substantial quantities, and at prices which do
not permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time in the nor-
mal course of trade, the home market sales are required to be disregarded
and a "constructed value" is required by the Act to be determined and ap-
plied in making the required price discrimination analysis.6 Where price
discrimination exists and injury is found, a special dumping duty is levied
equal to the difference between the purchase price of the goods when ready
for export to the United States and the foreign market value as determined
under the statute.7
The effect of the statute, therefore, is to take into account the physical
isolation of the United States from the Japanese and European steel pro-
ducers, as well as the attendant transportation, insurance, handling, tariff
and other costs which such steel shipments must carry. One would reasonably
conclude that foreign steel products, if they enter the United States [t all,
economically would have to be priced to the American market at about the
same level as the domestic steel products. However, after considering the
above-mentioned costs associated with foreign steel shipments into the United
States, it would seem reasonable to conclude that much of the European
steel, in particular, would have to enter the American market at even higher
prices than the available domestic supply.
The reason for this is that the goods are substantially fungible. The
domestic industry, whatever one thinks of it, is at the very least, competitive
in production costs with European producers, and therefore the domestic
companies start with a substantial advantage in servicing the United States
market. With respect to the Japanese, the effect of freight, tariffs and in-
surance, in addition to export packaging costs and the profits for distributors
within the United States, should substantially compensate for any production
cost advantage that may have existed in that country in recent years.
What business common sense would suggest and informed analyses con-
firm is that in the United States market, the domestic'industry is the low cost,
efficient supplier. And, since no one disputes (and Citibank's reports in-
variably confirm) that the steel industry average profits are far less than the
average of all manufacturing industry profits, then why and how has it come
to pass that foreign steel has grown from about ten percent of the apparent
domestic supply in 1965 to about eighteen percent in 1977 and, in the month
of July 1978, to about twenty percent? Stated another way, how has it come
5 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
9 Id. §§ 160(b)(1)(A), 161(a).
I Id. § 161(a).
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to pass that the growth of the United States steel market has been taken by
foreign steel producers?
The answer is, of course, that the foreign steel has been knowingly, con-
sciously and intentionally dumped by foreign producers with full regard and
understanding of the Antidumping Act-more precisely stated, in full
understanding of, and disregard for, the statute.
That there is no doubt that steel is being dumped in the United States
from both Japan and the EEC is shown by the 1977 and 1978 studies of
Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc. (PHB). In their latest paper entitled, "The
Economic Implications of Foreign Steel Pricing Practices in the U.S. Market,"
PHB describes not only the dumping but also the cost of that dump-
ing to the United States steel industry and to our economy generally. In the
last two years, bankruptcy, failing companies, the shutdown of production
facilities for millions of tons of product, reduced dividends and the layoff of
tens of thousands of employees have characterized the United States steel
community. Congressional investigations, Executive branch investigations, the
Solomon Report and the trigger price mechanism have followed in response.
However, there is an even deeper problem, that is to say, the human prob-
lems caused by the dumping, and this is the cumulative effect of the many
years of dumping, with its depressing effect on both prices (and therefore,
profits) and volume-an effect which has created grave problems with respect
to the ability of these private companies to provide the capital and support
for the cost of new production facilities.
To return to the point: How has this come to pass? What has happened
to the 1921 Act?
If you assume that there has been, and continues to be, massive and
widespread dumping within the meaning of the Act, all in the face of the
price discrimination provisions of the Act, two conditions had to exist. The
first is directly related to the statute and its administration, the second, to the
conditions which exist in the principal steel exporting countries. As the saying
goes, "it takes two to tango."
With respect to the statute and its administration: For many years in the
United.States, and irrespective of any particular political party, the political
and social reality was that the Antidumping Act simply was not permitted to
be enforced with respect of steel. The reasons were based upon domestic
policy considerations, foreign policy considerations and practical politics.
Perhaps the most significant reason was that stated recently by John J. Nevin,
Chairman of Zenith Radio Corporation:
U. S. policy in foreign trade matters continues to be based on what
has been aptly described as a 'Marshall Plan' mentality. That men-
tality sees Europe and Japan as so weak that they require very
substantial U. S. concessions in trade and other economic matters
and' the United States as so strong that it is immune from economic
injury, no matter what concessions are made by its government. 8
Nevin, Can U.S. Business Survive Our Japanese Trade Policy?, 56 HARV. Bus. REv. 165,
177 (Sept.-Oct. 1978).
[Vol. 2:52
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In any event, over the years, that has been the effect of the United States
Government policy with respect to foreign trade in steel. It was not that
the domestic steel industry did not point out to responsible government of-
ficials what was happening or that knowledgeable and informed officials were
unaware of what they were doing. This is neither the time nor the place to
describe the actions taken from 1965 onward by companies in the domestic
industry to alert the government to what unquestionably would be the result
of their steel trade actions, nor to discuss the repeated attempts to obtain ac-
tion under the Antidumping Act. Suffice it to say that until the catastrophic
events of the Summer and Fall of 1977, the United States Government's posi-
tion can be charitably described as benign neglect of the Antidumping Act
insofar as steel was concerned.
What was taking place offshore in those years from 1965 onward? In
Europe, social legislation had mandated full employment. For various
political and social reasons there was an inability to rationalize steel produc-
tion facilities throughout the ECSC. The lack of availability of private funds
for investment in steel facilities resulted in funding through national
treasuries in one way or another, with the usual consequence of government
participation in business policies. National, social and economic goals produced
the nationalization or quasi-nationalization of much of the European in-
dustry. The Japanese began to compete vigorously in traditional offshore
markets. Internal EEC price and stabilization systems were put into place. All
these and more, including in years past the need for dollars, resulted in many
of the European steel producers exporting to the United States at almost any
price and without regard to the price discrimination provisions of our Act.
In Japan, a completely different set of considerations existed. Steel was
made a target industry after World War II. Funds were made available
through the national treasury. The economic system of the nation was struc-
tured to facilitate the guidance of the industry so as to achieve pre-
determined national economic goals. Steel, shipbuilding, automobiles- all
steel-related or based products-were heavily emphasized by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the post-war period, and the
economic system was refined to produce the world's most successful modem
day application of merchantilism, that is, importing raw materials, protecting
the home market from competition, adding value and exporting finished
goods.
For different reasons in Japan than in Europe-for different reasons
within different countries of the EEC-the social, political and economic
systems forced steel products into the United States market which were priced
on the discriminatory basis that the Antidumping Act was intended to fore-
close. Further, prior to the establishment of the trigger price mechanism in
the Spring of 1978, the policy of the United States Government was, on
balance, one of manifest reluctance to enforce the Antidumping Act against
unfair price discrimination from foreign steel producers.
In all candor I would have to confess that the Antidumping Act as it now
exists is far from an efficient working tool, even if the government
1979]
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desired to enforce it to accomplish the purpose for which it was adopted. It is
slow-moving by its very terms. Elaborate procedures are built into it which re-
quire extremely heavy burdens of proof to be borne by the domestic industry.
Due process concepts contemplate hearings and findings. Withholding of ap-
praisement and the posting of bonds occur only after detailed investigations,
and only then after the passage of extended periods of time. In brief, the en-
tire complex of administrative processes and ritual serves to make it extraor-
dinarily difficult to obtain relief.
What then is the current situation?
After unsuccessful attempts were made to cause the American govern-
ment, under other provisions of our trade laws, to take action against the un-
fair trade practices of both the Japanese and European steel producers (in-
cluding a widely-publicized petition filed by AISI asking for relief for the in-
dustry from the diversionary effects of the secretly negotiated discriminatory
quota agreements of 1975 and 1976 between EEC and Japan), the combina-
tion of congressional pressure, resulting from the economic disaster in the
steel industry in the Summer and Fall of 1977, and the filing of numerous
dumping petitions by individual steel companies resulted in the now well-
known Solomon Report and ultimately the trigger price mechanism (TPM).
The trigger price mechanism is best characterized as a device which the
Treasury Department now is using to determine whether it will initiate formal
dumping investigations- an authority which the Treasury has long had but
never employed with respect' to steel. The TPM has been founded on a
Treasury analysis of Japanese steel industry costs, it being assumed that the
Japanese are the low cost exporter to the United States market.
Thirty-two different categories of steel mill products have been identified
and trigger prices established for substantially all of them. Each trigger price
has three elements: a base price, an extras charge and a transportation
charge.
Product coming in below the trigger price is to be investigated to see if it
is being dumped. Product arriving at or above the trigger price is not subject
to the Treasury-initiated investigation procedure. When TPM was installed, it
was the expressed hope of Treasury officials that it would serve to reduce im-
ports by twelve to fourteen million tons.
Numerous problems exist with the system and its reliance upon Japanese
costs. The operating rate utilized in the calculation is highly unrealistic. The
yields assumed are doubtful. The system for converting yen to dollars is
debatable, to say the least. Even with these flaws, it is a major, constructive
step.
All problems with the Japanese cost analysis, however, pale by com-
parison to the fact that EEC dumping simply is not affected by the trigger
price mechanism. That is, even though an EEC steel producer is price
discriminating within the meaning of the Act, so long as the steel is brought
in at the trigger price, Treasury has publicly said it will take no action. And,
of course, Treasury has said if the steel companies file their own dumping ac-
tions, it will be forced to terminate the system entirely. This open license to
[Vol. 2:52
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dump has been readily accepted by the EEC and Third World steel pro-
ducers. Imports during the first seven months of 1978 were 12,576,000 net
tons, an increase of more than thirty percent over the first seven months of
1977. In July 1978, imports were 1,785,000 tons, an increase of more than
400,000 tons over June 1978. At that rate, steel imports will exceed twenty
million tons by the end of 1978, setting a new record.
Steel imports from the EEC in the first seven months of 1978 were
4,383,000 tons, about ten percent more than from Japan in the same period,
and roughly equal to the tonnage imported from the rest of the world.
What, then, for the future? It is obvious that the United States Govern-
ment is only going to succeed in its efforts to stop foreign steel dumping by
promptly commencing formal dumping investigations which, of course, it is
authorized to do. If the government does so-and of course it controls the in-
vestigation and can turn it off as easily as turn it on-it is reasonable to an-
ticipate that the flow of dumped product will stop. Fair competition will then
exist. The domestic companies will then be fairly tested to see if they can
adequately serve the domestic market.
If the government does not take action, and if the flow of dumped steel
from Europe and Third World countries continues at the rate it has, I have
no doubt that dumping petitions will be filed, the litigation process ag-
gressively pushed, and congressional pressures steadily increased, all with
serious and long-lasting effects both domestically and overseas.
In conclusion, we are not dealing with a reluctance of the domestic in-
dustry to face competition. We are not dealing with an abstract concept of
free trade. There is unfair competition. It needs to be stopped. Fair inter-
national rules of trade in steel need to be established and followed, all to the
benefit of consumers, producers and workers, that is, to the benefit of us all.
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